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STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AND ADAPTATION
 As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once noted, we go to war with the Army (and Navy) we have. However, we do not necessarily win wars 
with the same armed forces or strategy with which we began them. Often, these 
forces initially are not optimized for the particular conflict in which they become 
engaged, and even when they are, adaptive adversaries present unanticipated 
challenges. Often throughout history, leaders have needed to recognize that their 
initial plans were not successful and that adaptation (organizationally, doctrin-
ally, or in weapons and equipment) was needed.1
Because of war’s inherently interactive nature, victory often depends on which 
side most quickly can recognize problems or gaps in performance and implement 
changes. Despite this well-grounded observation, interest has arisen only recently 
in how military organizations adapt during war.2 Moreover, what literature does 
exist focuses heavily on operational and tactical forms of change, overlooking 
strategic adaptation.
This article explores that gap, beginning with an overview of the literature on 
assessment and adaptation. Next it establishes an analytical framework for both 
strategic assessment and adaptation that will serve as the basis for a subsequent 
analysis of a particular strategic reassessment: the Obama administration’s surge 
decision in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.3 The 
article concludes by offering insights relevant to 
senior policy makers and the joint community.
ASSESSMENT AS ART AND SCIENCE
In studying military adaptation over the course 
of the twentieth century, one historian concluded 
6846_Hoffman.indd   45 6/9/16   3:39 PM
1
Hoffman: Strategic Assessment and Adaptation: Reassessing the Afghanistan
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 4 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
that “[a]daptation in one form or another has been a characteristic of success-
ful military institutions and human societies under the pressures of war�”4 Yet 
education and doctrine often overlook this strategic assessment and adaptation 
function�
While strategic assessment represents a crucial element of a state’s ability to 
adapt strategy to changing wartime conditions, it is not a regular field for schol-
arly study� This is odd, since it plays a critical role in determining the outcome 
and cost of wars�5 A major shortfall in the conduct of our national security sys-
tem has been the lack of appreciation for a continuous assessment of strategy 
implementation� Our national security mechanisms should not stop when the 
president issues a decision� Instead, an “end-to-end” approach must encompass 
policy formulation, strategy development, planning guidance, resource alloca-
tion and alignment, implementation oversight, and performance assessment 
based on feedback loops�6
Research by a number of experienced policy makers and scholars underscores 
how important it is for the National Security Council (NSC) system to incorpo-
rate effective mechanisms for oversight and performance assessment—yet how 
hard some agencies resist the same�7 The NSC remains a valuable mechanism for 
ensuring that presidents entertain a full set of feasible options, i�e�, that options 
and positions are vetted and aired; and that large governmental bureaucracies get 
the strategic direction they need�8 The NSC must also remain in oversight mode 
to ensure that strategic direction is implemented as intended�
The importance of campaign and operational assessment is well known to the 
American military community� Critical issues involved in assessment include 
evaluation of intelligence; likely international consequences of proposed actions; 
the operational plans proposed to obtain defined political objectives; and a state’s 
relative capabilities, including how well they relate to the requirements the strat-
egy proposed is likely to entail�9 The role of metrics in operational assessments 
and their complexity in accurately measuring progress in counterinsurgency 
campaigns is also recognized� So too is the potential danger of politicization of 
metrics to satisfy bureaucratic or institutional politics�
During the Vietnam War, U�S� military operations were assessed using new 
techniques derived from systems analysis and operations research� Derived from 
the physical sciences, these proved less valuable in capturing the more political 
and socioeconomic aspects of the Vietnam War� The assessment of progress at 
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was oversimplified in one 
sense by concentration on body counts and kill ratios, then later overcomplicated 
by consideration of an abundance of metrics�10 When critics challenged MACV’s 
strategy, there was strong pressure to generate favorable indicators to buttress the 
appearance of progress�11
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American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan faced similarly daunting re-
quirements for data collection�12 The challenges involved in selecting, collecting, 
and analyzing the right metrics in combat theaters are significant� There are 
myriad political, sociocultural, and economic factors relevant to combating in-
surgencies and civil wars� At the operational level, participants can operate under 
a biased view of how well they are doing but overlook disquieting indicators� At 
the strategic level, the national command authority needs to establish sources 
and consider the resultant feedback to monitor progress and adapt as necessary�
American experience in and official doctrine for assessment are limited, re-
sulting in “inventive but ad hoc solutions” at the operational level, as Ben Con-
nable puts it in Embracing the Fog of War�13 The analytical community crafted 
measures to promote an understanding of the operational effectiveness of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan� Assessing prog-
ress was recognized as important because the perception of progress has an effect 
on the sustainability of the war effort�14 Joint doctrine evolved to capture these 
lessons�
Although operational-level metrics and campaign assessments are necessary, 
they are not sufficient at the national level� An operational assessment provides 
insights into the progress of a strategy or campaign plan, but it should not be 
confused with a national strategic-level assessment, which must incorporate a 
much larger perspective involving international risks, opportunity costs, coali-
tion dynamics, and national resources� A strategic assessment often will take a 
regional if not a global perspective, and will factor in political elements� A strate-
gic assessment also must account for domestic political constraints, resourcing, 
and opportunity costs� The experience of the last fifteen years reveals more ad 
hoc solutions applied to this higher and less-quantitative form of strategic review�
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
To explore this challenge, I used Risa Brooks’s attributes of strategic assessment as 
an analytical framework�15 To evaluate the strategic logic and the appropriateness 
of the strategic adaptation decision, I added a fifth element� The five factors are 
defined as follows:
• Performance-assessment mechanisms capture the quality of institutional 
structures and processes devoted to evaluations of our intelligence concern-
ing enemy capabilities and capacities, as well as the evaluation of our own 
political and military activities and progress� Such mechanisms also must 
include a capacity to assess the interdependent political, diplomatic, and 
developmental activities consistent with effective counterinsurgency�
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• Collaborative information-sharing environment describes the routines and 
conventions of dialogue associated with exchanging information at the apex 
of decision making� Key to information sharing is the degree of openness 
and how forthcoming participants are about options and assessments not 
favorable to their preferred policy outcomes� “Collaborative” means a climate 
in which parties are free to explore options, test assumptions, and debate the 
merits of those options� A collaborative context is not consensus driven, but 
instead searches for good options and viable compromises�
• Strategic coordination captures the overall governmental structure and 
mechanisms used to develop and make policy decisions� These influence 
how well policy is defined, how strategies are developed, and how well mili-
tary aspects are coordinated with diplomatic activities and other aspects of 
the state� These measures should identify disconnects among the respective 
elements of a strategy, questionable assumptions, unintended consequences, 
and inconsistent objectives�16
• Decision-making authorization clarity captures how state leaders articulate 
and promulgate decisions and the degree to which those decisions are com-
municated unambiguously� Within this dimension, decision-making flexibil-
ity, subordinates’ prerogatives, and accountability for constituent pieces of a 
larger strategy are allocated and defined�
• Strategic coherence evaluates the inherent logic of the proposed adaptation 
and its linkage of ends, ways, and means� A coherent strategy matches a 
selected approach to the diagnosed problem and allocates commensurate 
responsibility and resources�17 Coherence integrates the use of all instruments 
and tools of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and eco-
nomic� The purpose of a strategy is to establish and preserve the alignment of 
ends, ways, and means�18 That alignment is the essence of coherence�
As Richard Betts has noted, “Strategy fails when the chosen means prove in-
sufficient to the ends� This can happen because the wrong means are chosen or 
because the ends are too ambitious or slippery�”19 To that we should add, “� � � or 
because the wrong way is selected�” All three—ends, ways, and means—have to 
be tied together coherently�
This set of factors is crucial to creating a foundation for understanding ad-
aptation at the strategic level� One cannot understand strategic-level adaptation 
without considering the mechanisms and institutional capacity for strategic as-
sessment� The criteria employed in our evaluation of the strategic adaptations in 
this case study are presented in the table below�
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ASSESSING THE OBAMA ASSESSMENT
The detailed history of the protracted debate over Afghanistan strategy has been 
covered elsewhere�20 This section focuses on an analysis of the major components 
of the assessment�
Performance-Assessment Mechanisms
Even state-of-the-art operational assessment leaves much to be desired, and there 
is no evidence from the Afghan surge debate to suggest that strategic assessment 
is any easier to perform or yields better results� Multiple assessments by RAND, 
NATO allies, and service schools concluded that the complex metrics collection 
systems used in Afghanistan did not meet policy needs or those of military deci-
sion makers�21 One study on operational assessment noted, “Once again, � � � the 
pitfalls in trying to quantify complex dynamics [have] made the production of 
accurate and useful assessments a persistently elusive aim�”22
The challenges in Afghanistan included the complexity of the counterinsur-
gency effort and the management of a large coalition� ISAF eventually put an 
extensive effort into data collection, but the focus was on operational and tacti-
cal data, and not at the right level for strategic audiences� One scholar concluded 
that the flaws in the currently used approaches “are sufficiently egregious” that 
professional military judgment on assessments is “rightfully distrusted�”23 The in-
grained optimism—the “can-do” spirit—of the U�S� military may be an additional 
complicating factor�24
Assessments in Afghanistan proved especially problematic owing to that 
campaign’s dynamics, producing numerous criticisms and recommendations 
for innovative solutions�25 NATO produced a major evaluation of the credibil-
ity of assessment methods for both Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation 
Assessment and Adaptation Factors Criteria
1� Performance-assessment  
mechanisms
Did the NSC have a process to monitor independently data collected on 
progress and costs, and other relevant metrics?
2� Collaborative environment  Did the process allow perspectives and intelligence to be completely shared 
in a climate in which parties were free to explore policy aims, assumptions, 
and options openly?
3� Strategic coordination Did the coordination process produce both strategic positions and options? 
Were they integrated and coordinated?
4� Decision-making authorization 
clarity
Was a clear presidential decision issued, in writing, with timely  
guidance?
5� Strategic coherence Did the selected strategy adaptation resolve the diagnosed problem and 
align ends, ways, and means?
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ENDURING FREEDOM� That effort found that “[i]n both of these campaigns, se-
nior leaders across the various coalition nations demanded reams of quantitative 
data from their operational commanders which, in some cases, may have been 
an attempt to compensate for a lack of operational and strategic clarity and the 
inability to discern meaningful progress over time�”26
The NATO study includes a report that one regional command in Afghanistan 
required subordinate units to collect and transmit some four hundred different 
metrics� A senior assessment officer in Kabul once estimated that more than two 
thousand mandatory reportable quantitative metrics were levied on subordinate 
units across the theater�27
In Afghanistan in the summer of 2009, the newly appointed commander of 
ISAF, Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, knew the critical importance of 
assessment and indicators at both the operational and strategic levels of war� 
Specifically, he understood that ISAF needed to identify and refine appropriate 
indicators to assess progress so as to clarify the difference between operational 
measures of effectiveness critical to practitioners on the ground and strategic 
measures more appropriate to national capitals�28 In contrast, the component 
agencies tended to define their contributions and metrics in terms of inputs or 
traditional tasks rather than the actual outputs achieved�
McChrystal’s strategic review, which received augmentation by volunteer 
scholars, warrants more study in that it is an exception: it strove to be a real stra-
tegic assessment�29 However, its orientation was on defining the requirements for 
a fully resourced and effective counterinsurgency effort, answering the presumed 
question about what it would take to defeat the Taliban, as opposed to providing 
a clear delineation of national interests, policy, and options� In addition, while the 
ISAF review was quite impressive, it lacked a broad enough charter and repre-
sentation (State Department, embassy, coalition, and interagency) to serve as the 
basis for subsequent NSC deliberations� Moreover, it failed to address the trans-
regional and political barriers that were the real problem in obtaining desired 
results� Some believe that the McChrystal approach should be continued—but 
they fail to recognize how critically the report was received at the White House�
In any case, theater military commands are not structured to produce such 
strategic assessments� The ISAF product failed to incorporate alliance perspec-
tives, much less the concerns of U�S� ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry; 
and it did not truly address Pakistan� It was too narrow, so it only spurred the 
larger and longer review that the president and NSC staff started immediately 
upon receiving ISAF’s inputs and troop request�
Overall, in this case, performance-assessment mechanisms were limited, par-
ticularly at the NSC, which in the summer of 2009 was not yet effectively oversee-
ing the administration’s foreign policy agenda�
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Collaborative Information-Sharing Environment
The president’s desire for disciplined debate, his request for options, and his evi-
dent discomfort with early portions of the debate suggest that information shar-
ing was limited� The president’s reaching out to his staff and to the vice chairman 
to gain additional insights and to push for more-constrained options suggests 
that this component of the process was not fully satisfied�
Some scholars suggest that, by trying to preclude political interference, the 
military input to the Afghanistan assessment process ended up degrading the 
civil-military discourse needed both to understand and to alter the strategy in 
that campaign�30 No overt efforts to manipulate assessment data in Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM have been identified, but the strategic dialogue between na-
tional and theater-level officials certainly was strained� Participants share consid-
erable agreement that candor and trust were corrupted early in the process, and 
that their resultant low levels negatively impacted the decision-making process� 
On several occasions, speeches, leaks, and comments to the media or Congress 
created the impression that the military was trying to maneuver the president 
into a box�31 McChrystal’s assessment was leaked almost as soon as it arrived in 
Washington, and Ambassador Eikenberry’s secret cables also were deliberately 
given to the media� Both former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General 
McChrystal believe that these leaks and media comments negatively impacted 
the decision-making process� Policy options and strategic discourse between 
civilian and military officials at the NSC are best conducted in a climate in which 
candor exists and options and various positions are debated thoroughly� Such a 
context helps produce sound policy decisions and strategies�32
Strategic Coordination
In the case of Afghanistan, the NSC initially was not aware of the existence of 
resource gaps, confusion over the mission, or inconsistent objectives� It was not 
aware that the ISAF staff was unclear about U�S� policy objectives, and that, in the 
absence of clear policy aims or guidance, ISAF was making a counterinsurgency 
approach the basis of its strategy� The terms of reference for the ISAF strategic 
assessment, issued by Mr� Gates, were vague, but ISAF took many steps to ensure 
its own review had a strategic focus�
The greatest challenge in the surge debate was over the assessment of strategy 
options� A president and his policy team need options, and Mr� Obama expressly 
asked for distinct options� These should include a full range of credible options, 
not just the preferred solution� A military leader with NSC experience notes that 
representatives “must generate real strategic options to give the president actual 
choices; however, the ends to which each option can aspire and the inherent risks 
involved in them are often dissimilar, and the nation’s senior civilian leadership 
needs to understand those dynamics as well�”33
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If the president does not believe in the validity of the options the military 
provides, he will seek options elsewhere� The military did not give President 
George W� Bush a range of options for Iraq in 2006 until he insisted on their 
development, nor did it give President Obama a range of options for Afghanistan 
in 2009� Mr� Obama was not well served by the seemingly united front created 
by a Secretary of Defense, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and a 
regional combatant commander who aligned behind, and limited discussion to, 
one option� Because of this, the president was engaged in deliberations more than 
was typical, and he felt compelled to generate his own option�34
A second weak spot in the 2009 assessment was the isolation of the political 
element of the strategy from the military component� There was little doubt the 
thirty-thousand-troop surge would enhance security� It would blunt the Taliban’s 
momentum, buying additional time by slowing, if not reversing, Taliban gains� 
The injection of additional forces could lead Taliban leaders to reconsider and 
to recognize that the United States was increasingly committed to securing U�S� 
interests, which could lead to more mutually beneficial negotiations within Af-
ghanistan� Yet while the proposed new strategy accepted Afghan president Karzai 
as a difficult partner, the surge decision was not used to create additional political 
leverage and conditionality for Karzai to reform his government and mitigate 
levels of corruption and incompetence� Furthermore, the NSC decision did not 
assess and resolve correctly whether the Afghan security forces could meet their 
recruiting goals and minimum effectiveness standards within the resource con-
straints and timelines President Obama had framed� Creating sustainable Afghan 
national security forces clearly would be a longer-term but relevant issue if U�S� 
security interests were to be served� Finally, the State Department’s contributions 
were long on promise but short on delivery� Both the strategic assessment and 
NSC oversight should have tested State’s capacity actually to support the plan�
Coordination requires that both sides actually endeavor to understand vari-
ous civilian and military perspectives� This is not a simple matter� As Dr� Janine 
Davidson, a former Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy official, has 
noted:
The “professional” military officer has certain expectations about how to craft “best 
military advice” for the President that are deeply embedded into the organizational 
culture and in fact hard-wired into the institutionalized and incredibly detailed 
military planning processes� This planning process is designed with expectations 
about the roles civilian leadership will play in providing guidance, which are in many 
ways out of synch with the expectations of the President and his civilian advisers� 
Ultimately, the output of the military’s planning process fails to deliver the type of nu-
anced advice in the form of creative options that the President needs�35
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Ultimately, the nation’s best interests are served when strategy decisions are 
the product of a rigorous process in which civilian policy makers have options 
and are informed about risks�36 Such reviews require a thorough examination of a 
full range of feasible options� In this case, however, it was only with the personal 
involvement of and “pushing” by the president that discrete policy options were 
developed and debated� Ultimately, again with the deliberate engagement of the 
president, competing factions hashed out a consensus on both the aims and the 
specific “ways” of a strategy� However, because the gaps in political strategy were 
left open, and because the requisite nonmilitary contributions from State and the 
Agency for International Development were not tested for true feasibility, the 
strategic coordination phase, while deliberate, was less than robust, and therefore 
not fully satisfactory�
Decision-Making Authorization Clarity
There appears to be little doubt that the president was immersed fully in making, 
and invested fully in, the final strategic decisions in 2009� However, the six-page 
strategic memorandum that President Obama purportedly authored contains 
contradictions� The president apparently intended, on the basis of a reading of 
Gordon Goldstein’s Lessons in Disaster, that the Vietnam War problem of unclear 
objectives would not be repeated�37 Yet his strategic guidance, while intended to 
reduce ambiguity and reflect the president’s commitment to the decision, evi-
dences distinct tensions between the diagnosis of the problems in Afghanistan 
and a limited allocation of resources and time�
Clarity was augmented by the discourse among the principals, and by the pres-
ident directly questioning each to receive an express assent to the final strategy� 
From the inauguration in January 2009 through late November, the ISAF com-
mander may have had some questions about what the new administration really 
wanted to achieve in Afghanistan; that doubt or ambiguity was clarified during 
the surge debate� The president’s 29 November memo reinforces the clarity of the 
commander’s intent� The U�S� goal in Afghanistan was “to deny safe haven to al 
Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government�” 
The military mission was defined in six operational objectives, which were to be 
“limited in scope and scale to only what is necessary to attain the U�S� goal�”38 In 
case there was any question, the president’s memo noted, “This approach is not 
fully resourced counterinsurgency or nation building�”39 However, the president 
also listed numerous military and civilian tasks at the operational level that are 
fully consistent with a broad counterinsurgency approach� The guidance instructs 
the military to reverse the Taliban’s momentum, deny it access to and control of 
key population centers and lines of communication, disrupt the insurgency and 
NWC_Summer2016Review.indb   53 6/8/16   3:58 PM
9
Hoffman: Strategic Assessment and Adaptation: Reassessing the Afghanistan
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
its Al Qaeda allies, and degrade their capability to a point at which Afghan na-
tional security forces could manage the threat�
There is little doubt the president reshaped the mission’s scale; authorized 
resources for specific purposes; and introduced a temporal dimension, fram-
ing a faster introduction of U�S� forces� But while he narrowed the mission and 
authorized a substantial force, that force was to accomplish many challenging 
tasks within a tight time frame� Moreover, that time frame was introduced into 
the debate only belatedly, at a time when military commanders were not inclined 
to argue with the president� Overall, this element of the framework was satisfied 
only partially�
Strategic Coherence
Senior leaders, both civilians and military officers, are hard pressed in their 
deliberations to preserve the vital linkages between policy and strategy and 
between objectives and operations� Richard Betts has warned that busy leaders 
have little time to ensure that the logic of a strategy is tested or that the coher-
ence of ends, ways, and means is preserved� Often what is left is a strategy that 
“has unexamined assumptions and slogans left over from coping with their main 
preoccupations�”40
The adaptations the Obama administration proposed in 2009 sought to align 
U�S� strategy better with policy aims, but ended up focusing almost entirely on 
the military “means”—the size and duration of the surge—rather than the pos-
sible “ways�” Despite references throughout the strategy review to the centrality 
of Afghan politics and governance, there is little evidence that alternative political 
strategies were considered�41
As Secretary Gates has noted, the concept of an efficient, corruption-free, 
effective Afghan central government was “a fantasy�”42 By 2009, there was grow-
ing recognition that the highly centralized Afghan government created through 
the 2001 Bonn Agreement and the 2004 constitution was becoming untenable�43 
While McChrystal’s staff was cognizant of the need for a bottom-up approach to 
complement efforts to build the capacity of the central government, the White 
House review process did not generate alternative political strategies to induce 
Kabul to devolve power or reduce its perceived corruption�44
Policy and strategic discussions during this reassessment too often focused 
on the familiar military component (force levels, deployment timelines, and so 
forth) and too little on the larger challenge of political reform, state building, 
and host-nation capacity� The need for some political influence over Karzai was 
evident, but was not incorporated into the U�S� strategy� Unlike in Iraq, there was 
no discussion about using conditionality of U�S� support as a form of leverage to 
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push for political reforms in Kabul� Absent those changes, as Ambassador Eiken-
berry stressed, success from the surge would be limited�45
The strategic assessment conducted in 2009 better defined U�S� core interests, 
policy, and plans� Were those criteria exhaustive, the strategy review would be 
judged a success� However, the decision was promulgated with a defined time 
limit� This had some utility, in that it created a sense of urgency for deploying 
troops and accelerating Afghan force training� But it also generated the percep-
tion of limited U�S� commitment to success� The premature announcement of 
the withdrawal was an error induced by U�S� domestic politics�46 This signaled 
to both our allies and regional powers that American patience was waning—and 
could be outlasted� This did not contribute to positive coalition or host-nation 
perceptions or to U�S� strategic success� Moreover, the civilian and political com-
ponents of the surge were not well integrated into the final strategy, leaving them 
less likely to be implemented as needed�
INSIGHTS
Improving Performance Assessment
Continuous monitoring of strategy implementation is a task shared among the 
NSC, OSD, and Joint Staff� Periodic reassessment is necessary for the successful 
prosecution of any strategy, and its scope should include intelligence, assump-
tions, and execution� In this case, a lack of staff mechanisms for monitoring 
prevented the necessary reassessment and the timely development of potential 
solutions for the president� The NSC staff should institutionalize these mecha-
nisms rather than depend on ad hoc tasking�
The experience of the last two wars suggests that improved strategic oversight 
is needed�47 Instead of a planning board, strategic planning directorate, or war 
czar, some form of implementation board or strategy assessment directorate ap-
pears warranted�48 Implementation oversight really should be the most important 
role the NSC staff plays on behalf of the cabinet� But “unless the President himself 
makes it very clear that the NSC staff has specific authority to oversee implemen-
tation, there is a strong resistance from the Departments to respond to the NSC 
staff,” as a former NSC staffer has noted�49
The functional departments should not view this role for the NSC staff as “in-
trusive�”50 And the cost of a dozen personnel at the White House seems a pittance 
if it helps a harried set of leaders understand how well their strategic direction 
is being implemented or how the adversary is reacting� It certainly amounts to 
far less than the bill for poorly crafted strategies or ineffective operations� The 
NSC leadership should be able to conduct independent and rigorous strategic 
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reassessments, and employ red-teaming techniques�51 Reassessments must be 
brutally objective and consider external and diverse viewpoints (including those 
of coalition partners)� It is hard for folks to “grade their own homework” objec-
tively or to recognize quickly that a preferred plan is not succeeding� The em-
ployment of staff dedicated to these reassessments would help to avoid strategic 
inertia and the politicization of the assessment process�52
Building and Sustaining a Collaborative Environment
Given the complex nature of contemporary conflict, integrated strategy develop-
ment and assessment processes are necessary� In an atmosphere of deliberation, 
candor, and transparency, efforts should focus on maximizing the value of diverse 
and interdisciplinary inputs to policy/strategy development and assessment�
The experience of the past fourteen years suggests that effective civilian and 
military interaction is (and always has been) critical to the framing of realistic 
policy objectives and effective strategy�53 Effective civil-military relations are 
critical to effectiveness in assessing and adapting national policy�54
Senior joint leaders must strive to sustain a professional relationship with 
civilian policy makers and avoid the appearance of trying to go around or negate 
presidential decisions� An absence of friction within policy debates would be 
suspect, but such friction never should be publicly evident, at least emanating 
from military professionals�55
Collaboration does not mean tension-free debate or the subordination of the 
military� The existing NSC system has tensions built into it; these make debates 
uncomfortable but productive� Instead of fighting the process or trying to impose 
a military framework on civilian politicians, military leaders should understand 
the process and embrace it�56 As former CJCS Mike Mullen has noted, “Policy 
and strategy should constantly struggle with one another� Some in the military no 
doubt would prefer political leadership that lays out a specific strategy and then 
gets out of the way, leaving the balance of the implementation to commanders 
in the field� But the experience of the last nine years tells us two things: A clear 
strategy for military operations is essential; and that strategy will have to change 
as those operations evolve�”57
Senior military leaders should understand that influence and trust go together 
and that, just as networking and relationships with peers are important to pro-
fessional success, the same relationship building will pay dividends vis-à-vis po-
litical leaders�58 Moreover, civil-military relations are an important professional 
ethic and part of the educational process for both civilian and military leaders�59 
Senior officers embrace that ethic, but also must temper their public communica-
tions carefully to avoid creating an impression that they are attempting to influ-
ence decisions in the public arena�
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Improving Strategic Coordination
It is important for senior military leaders to understand the decision-making 
process and participate in that process fully� American history contains examples 
of problems encountered in the meshing of civilian and military perspectives�60 
Given the iterative nature of policy and strategy formulation, some tense interac-
tion should be expected; however, a deep historical understanding of strategy and 
solid relationships should overcome friction at the council table�
An important insight for senior policy advisers is to understand how decisions 
are made and how information is evaluated in the policy/strategy process� Policy 
makers are not hardwired to apply lockstep templates or a linear, military-style 
decision-making process� NSC staff officials will not be graduates of professional 
military education (PME) programs� Civilian political officials often will explore 
an array of options without defining a firm political end state� They may be more 
comfortable exploring “the art of the possible” and examining political factors 
and risks differently, including in a far more fluid or intuitive manner� They may 
be more comfortable with ambiguity, political elements, and other intangibles�
During reassessment, as during strategy development, senior military leaders 
should be prepared to challenge assumptions and vague policy aims, as well as to 
offer creative options (ways) to satisfy desired ends� As one military observer to 
this process has concluded, “To be effective and to assist the president in crafting 
and implementing national-security policy involving military force, senior mili-
tary leaders must embrace a more involved role in the back-and-forth dialogue 
necessary to build effective policies and workable strategies�”61
Senior joint leaders must give the president options as, at the end of the day, he 
is the accountable decision maker� As General Martin Dempsey observed, “That’s 
what being commander in chief is all about�”62 Options not wholly acceptable 
or valid for military reasons may still be viable to policy makers and should be 
considered, even when they are neither preferred nor supported� Of several pos-
sible “sins” in strategy development, the commandant of the Army War College, 
Major General William Rapp, noted that the first is for the military to present a 
single option to civilian leaders, trying to force a decision rather than engender a 
dialogue� The next-worst course is to offer an artificially framed suite of strategic 
options centered on the option desired, with all the rest designed to be presented 
as throwaways�63
Policy makers want options, but these need to be real options; they must be 
feasible and suitable; they cannot merely be politically expedient, nor merely 
satisfy preferred military paradigms�64 A failure to provide more than a single 
solution will cede the initiative to the NSC staff or other outlets� Senior military 
officers critical of what they perceive as recent NSC staff intrusions into strategy 
options overlook their own responsibility for previously having shorted President 
NWC_Summer2016Review.indb   57 6/8/16   3:58 PM
13
Hoffman: Strategic Assessment and Adaptation: Reassessing the Afghanistan
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 5 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Obama’s request for an array of strategic options in Afghanistan� In the Afghani-
stan case study, a number of options did emerge, but the NSC process failed to 
reconcile those competing views productively�65
The Department of Defense should adapt its education programs to prepare of-
ficers better for the complexity of national-level policy-making processes at the in-
teragency level� Those reforms should emphasize a more iterative mode of policy- 
strategic interaction�66 We are preparing future military leaders for frustration 
or failure if they come away from the classroom with only a linear and mecha-
nistic approach to strategy, one that is long on process and short on the reality 
of strategy development at the highest levels� Educational programs also should 
ensure that military officers understand the interplay of all elements of national 
power� Senior military leaders need to be able to participate in and shape national 
strategy discussions involving these elements, not just to apply military tools�67
Gaining Better Strategic Decision Clarity 
It is clear that military leaders were unclear on U�S� policy aims in Afghanistan 
during much of the first year of the Obama administration�68 Theoretically, the 
president himself established the strategic clarity behind the Afghan surge in a 
formal document late in the deliberative reassessment process� Despite that doc-
ument, some, such as Professor Hew Strachan, have claimed that there was a lack 
of clear political guidance, resulting in doubt about what the actual U�S� policy 
was�69 Yet the ISAF commander and the U�S� ambassador, along with their chains 
of command all the way back to Washington, participated in a rather painstaking 
review of that policy� If, after the December decision and the presidential speech, 
there was confusion about either the policy or the resulting strategy, it was not 
because senior military leaders were absent from the council table or they lacked 
the president’s written guidance� More accurately, the final decision contained 
compromises that reduced clarity and imposed constraints on the strategy that 
Central Command and ISAF preferred, in terms of time and force levels� A lack 
of agreement on an element of the strategy is not the same as a lack of clarity� The 
president’s guidance memo was clear on the “how” and the “what,” but was silent 
on the inherently political “why” and the desired end being sought� Understand-
ing Mr� Obama’s intent would have helped�
The NSC staff can also do a better job of generating presidential policy deci-
sions in a timely manner� To preserve strategic coherence and coordination at 
lower levels across the joint force, senior defense leaders should ensure these 
decisions are promulgated�
Establishing Greater Strategic Coherence
At the national level, policies and strategy are inseparable� National strategies 
must focus on achieving political objectives� Because war is a political act, 
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military strategies must be embedded in and supportive of overall national strate-
gies� The latter must address the use of all elements of national power, they should 
be founded on a strategic logic, and the two types must be linked coherently to 
each other� Sustaining coherency, as Betts notes, involves asking “whether choices 
at any level do or do not maintain a logical consistency with levels above and 
below, and ultimately a consistency between political ends and military means�” 
Senior military leaders must be prepared to serve as the principal strategists to 
ensure a coherent linkage between desired policy objectives and a detailed and 
feasible plan to obtain them�
Strategic coherence in conflicts such as Afghanistan includes a political ele-
ment, and during that conflict U�S� military officers appeared reticent in engaging 
in that element of strategic discourse (General Petraeus was an exception)� Yet 
senior officers have to be cognizant of all instruments of power and the elements 
that drive conflict� National and military strategies are not separate, and military 
officers cannot simply isolate themselves in a professional “lane�”70 Civilian of-
ficials expect to receive inputs from military leaders who truly are expert in their 
sphere (the application of military force), but they also prize advice from senior 
officials who understand how the different components of U�S� power are inte-
grated and best applied coherently�71
The political literacy of U�S� military officers is considered suspect by some 
of the military’s own strategists�72 This may be a function of the U�S� military’s 
apolitical character, which some scholarly observers find to be too focused on 
connecting operations to tactics and too ready to perceive the operational level of 
war as a “politics-free zone�”73 Instead, the interplay of political factors, including 
coalition and domestic politics, must be understood as part of high-level strategy� 
American military officers must get past their reserve about the role played by 
politics, in all its forms� Political considerations do not constitute simply an in-
convenient restraint on military operations�74 Over the course of the last decade, 
the American military community has experienced the consequences of politi-
cal illiteracy and has absorbed a keener appreciation for political influence at all 
levels�75 PME institutions should ensure their curricula capture and reflect this 
hard-earned experience�
The military literacy of civilian officials requires equal attention� Civilian 
leaders need a better appreciation for the complexities of military strategy and 
operations� Richard Betts’s observation from fifteen years ago remains just as true 
today: “For strategy to bridge policy and operations, civilian and military profes-
sionals on either side of the divide need more empathy with the priorities and 
limitations that those on the other side face� � � � Civilians cannot do this respon-
sibly, however, unless they acquire much more empirical knowledge of tactics, 
logistics, and operational doctrines than is normal for top-level staff these days�”76
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Our senior military leaders must be completely frank about the limits of raw 
military power, risk, and time frames for action�77 They also should ensure that 
military resources are not being risked without commensurate support from 
other agencies� In Afghanistan, the U�S� military was overinvested in doing its 
part, and it let military contributions get well ahead of the other instruments 
in the strategy�78 So security conditions were established, at great cost, to enable 
political and economic activities; but then nonmilitary elements of the strategy 
were completely absent, were not feasible, or were executed poorly�
Donald Rumsfeld was right: indeed, we do go to war with the military we have, 
and with an initial strategy as well� But wars rarely are won or concluded with the 
same force or the original strategy� The nature of war as a competitive clash of 
wills requires leaders, as the conflict evolves, to assess progress, recognize short-
falls, and resolve gaps in strategy or operational methods� The case studied herein 
supports the conclusion that the capacity to oversee implementation, conduct 
assessments, and alter strategy under fire during wartime is a clear contributor 
to strategic success� Professor Williamson Murray concluded a 2011 study of 
military adaptation with the claim that “[t]he ability to adapt at every level of war 
from the tactical to the strategic and political would seem to be more important 
� � � than [at] any time since 1941�”79 If that is true, this research is both timely and 
relevant�
U�S� policy makers and our military leaders eventually learned this lesson in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan� They adapted strategies to reflect new or changed 
circumstances� The joint force adapted its approaches in both conflicts and 
changed the senior commanders� However, this case shows we have room for 
improvement in tying together policy and strategy changes while conducting 
wartime reassessments� While senior-level courses at joint PME institutions ad-
dress national decision-making processes, more attention to enhancing political 
literacy of future leaders appears warranted�
Future military leaders should draw on this case to enhance their understand-
ing of strategic decision making and the assessment processes at the apex of our 
government� Strategic success in the future undoubtedly will depend on the 
factors that facilitated past successful strategies: proactivity in making choices, 
flexibility over rigidity, and discipline in thinking when applying force in the pur-
suit of political goals�80 It also will require an understanding of the influence of 
cognitive limitations, organizational politics, military culture, and civil-military 
relations that can preclude the timely conduct of strategic assessments�81
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